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Inside the hybrid organization: 
An organizational level view of responses to conflicting institutional demands 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. An 
inductive comparative case study of four social enterprises that scaled their organization while 
embedded in competing social welfare and commercial logics suggests that, when facing 
competing organizational templates imposed by their institutional environment, organizations 
attempt to strike a balance at the organizational level by adopting a combination of intact 
practices from both logics instead of balancing at the practice level by resorting to strategies 
such as decoupling. In addition, we find an important legitimating effect of founding origins: 
in a sector where the social welfare logic is ultimately predominant, organizations originating 
from the social sector benefited from an a priori legitimacy capital, which allowed them to 
borrow freely from both social and commercial practices. In contrast, organizations emanating 
from the commercial sector, suffering from an a priori legitimacy deficit, had to display their 
conformity with social templates in order to secure their acceptance in the field and therefore 
adopted predominantly social practices. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of 
hybrid organizations and point to the founding origins of organizations as an important 
determinant of the pattern of hybridization strategies.  
 
 2 
There is a growing recognition that organizations are often exposed to conflicting 
demands from their institutional environment (Djelic & Quack, 2004; Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Heimer, 1999; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Ring, Bigley, D'Aunno & Khanna, 2005; Scott, 
1994). Organizations are indeed subject to a large number of uncoordinated regulatory, 
normative and cognitive pressures which require of them the adoption of goals or practices 
that may be at odds (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). At the organizational field level, competing 
institutional demands originate from competing logics (Scott, 2001; Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008), i.e. conflicting conceptions about the appropriate goals to pursue as well as the 
appropriate means to achieve them (Scott, 1987). Earlier empirical explorations of the 
phenomenon of competing logics focused on the transitory phenomenon of the replacement of 
a dominant logic by an alternative one (Hoffman, 1999; Lounsbury, 2005; Nigam & Ocasio, 
2009; Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003; Thornton, Jones & Kury, 2005). This stream of research 
suggested that conflict in institutional demands is resolved at the field level by the progressive 
assimilation by the incumbent logic of features of challenging logics (Hoffman, 1999). 
However, organization scholars have started to recognize that when fields are fragmented and 
moderately centralized - i.e. when no institutional constituent clearly dominates the field yet 
several of them have enough power to constrain organizational actions - conflicting demands 
are not likely to be resolved at the field level and will be imposed on organizations (Pache & 
Santos, 2010). Under such field configurations, organizations find themselves permanently 
embedded in competing logics (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 
2009) and need to resolve the resulting conflict. This places them in a challenging situation 
because satisfying one set of demands requires defying or ignoring the others (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). The purpose of this paper is to investigate how organizations respond to 
these permanently competing institutional demands. 
Two independent streams of research have explored the issue of organizational 
responses to competing institutional demands. The first stream focuses on decoupling as a 
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response strategy to institutional pluralism (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; 
Meyer et al., 1977; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; , 1998; , 2001). A more recent stream explores 
more broadly the impact of competing institutional logics on organizations (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Binder, 2007; Greenwood, Diaz, Li & Lorente, 2010; Kraatz et al., 2008; 
Lounsbury, 2007; Pache et al., 2010; Reay et al., 2009; Tracey, Phillips & Jarvis, 2010).  
In the first stream, decoupling studies, which have a long tradition in institutional 
theory, predict that under conditions of competing institutional demands, organizations 
decouple their formal structure from their operational structure (Boxenbaum et al., 2008; 
George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin & Barden, 2006; Meyer et al., 1977; Scott, 2003). 
Organizational leaders symbolically adopt the structures or practices demanded by 
institutional referents to project a legitimate image, yet they do not actually implement these 
elements internally. Instead, they try to avoid the scrutiny of institutional referents (which 
should not discover the deceit) while adopting the practices that are aligned with their own 
institutional affinities. Both quantitative (Edelman, 1992; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Westphal et 
al., 1994; , 2001) and qualitative (Aurini, 2006; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992) empirical studies 
provide support for the prediction that decoupling is a viable response to competing 
institutional demands (Boxenbaum et al., 2008). Organizations have been shown to decouple 
when facing competing demands regarding quality management practices (Kostova et al., 
2002; Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 1997), equal opportunity employment practices (Edelman, 
1992), audit reporting processes (Basu, Dirsmith & Gupta, 1999), the use of ethic codes 
(Stevens, Steensma, Harrison & Cochran, 2005), the adoption of long term incentive plans for 
CEO compensation (Westphal et al., 1994; , 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995), the adoption of 
stock repurchase programs (Westphal et al., 2001) and the adoption of a shareholder value 
orientation (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Fiss et al., 2006). Overall this stream of research suggests 
that when facing competing demands related to a given practice, organizations find ways to 
alter that practice in a way that makes it acceptable to all institutional referents. A limitation 
 4 
of this stream of research is that the focus on the practice level has hampered its ability to 
provide a comprehensive organizational level view of organizational responses to competing 
institutional demands. Another limitation of these predictions is that organizations 
permanently embedded in competing demands may find it difficult to avoid the scrutiny of 
institutional referents over the long term, which suggests that decoupling is a response 
strategy that is hard to sustain in such contexts. 
In the second stream, recent studies attempt to predict how organizations respond to 
permanently competing logics (Battilana et al., 2010; Binder, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2010; 
Lounsbury, 2007; Reay et al., 2009). Empirical work in this stream provides support for the 
prediction that the availability of competing institutional models of action creates latitude for 
organizational members to exercise some level of strategic choice (Clemens & Cook, 1999; 
Dorado, 2005; Seo & Creed, 2002; Tracey et al., 2010), because it allows them to avoid the 
taken-for-grantedness of institutional prescriptions. When embedded amidst competing logics, 
organizational members become aware of alternative courses of action. They no longer 
blindly comply with institutional pressures and may enact, as a result, different types of 
responses. Battilana and Dorado (2010), for instance, show that two micro finance institutions 
embedded in competing banking and development logics mobilized alternative socialization 
and hiring strategies to balance the competing expectations of their institutional environments. 
In a similar vein, Greenwood et al. (2010) show that the competing influence of market, state 
and family logics led to variation in the willingness of manufacturing firms to downsize their 
workforce. This line of work has again focused on specific organizational practices such as 
hiring strategies (Battilana et al., 2010), workforce downsizing (Greenwood et al., 2010) or 
contracting strategies (Lounsbury, 2007). Therefore, it offers only a partial view of how 
competing institutional logics are dealt with at the organizational level.  
In summary, whereas both decoupling studies and studies on competing logics offer 
useful insights into our phenomenon of interest, they assume that organizations manage the 
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tensions of competing demands through independent practice-level decisions. This 
assumption, however, does not take into account the fact that organizations are actually 
systems of interrelated practices (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). 
Organizational members may in fact choose to adopt certain configurations of practices or 
engage in balancing across practices (Oliver, 1991). For example, organizations may decouple 
a particular practice because they adhered to the stronger institutional prescriptions in other 
practices and have thus accumulated legitimacy capital. Or they may have been able to defy 
an institutional demand in one practice because of their efforts of appeasement through other 
practices. In the context of permanently competing institutional logics, where competing 
templates provide conflicting choices across many practices, organizational decision-makers 
are unlikely to make practice-level decisions in piece-meal fashion. By looking at isolated 
practices, without taking into account organizational level dynamics, researchers may have 
been “missing the forest for the trees”.   
This research project aims to address this gap. Our purpose is to develop an 
organizational level exploration of organizational responses to permanently competing 
institutional logics. How do organizational leaders configure their response strategies and 
why? What determines these configurations? Do organizations still resort to decoupling 
strategies in situations of permanent conflict or do they mobilize alternative strategies? So far 
these questions have been left largely unanswered. To shed light on this phenomenon, we 
conducted an inductive comparative case study in the field of “social integration enterprises” 
in France. Social integration enterprises aim at reintegrating long term unemployed people on 
the job market by hiring them to produce goods and services that are sold on the commercial 
market. By virtue of their goal and their operating principles, these organizations are rooted in 
competing social welfare and commercial logics. In the context of this study, we decided to 
explore more specifically the way in which four social integration enterprises combined these 
two logics as they organized their operations to achieve a national scale.  
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Our study deepens the understanding of the implications of institutional pluralism for 
organizations (Kraatz et al., 2008) and makes two important contributions. First, it highlights 
that organizations embedded in competing institutional logics balance conflicting demands at 
the organization level, rather than at the practice level, by strategically combining intact 
practices drawn from each logic. This strategy allows organizations to reduce the risks and 
costs of decoupling and hybridizing practices, which are particularly taxing in situations of 
permanently competing logics. Second, it identifies the organizations’ initial legitimacy 
capital as an important determinant of the configuration strategy adopted. Organizations 
benefiting from a priori legitimacy seem able to borrow freely from both logics to develop a 
hybrid template. In contrast, organizations suffering from an a priori legitimacy deficit 
overcompensate for this vulnerability by displaying an almost full adhesion to the 
predominant logic in the field. We further show that the founding origins of organizations 
play an important role in determining this initial stock of organizational legitimacy. 
Overall, our paper opens the black box of hybrid organizations, defined as 
organizations that are able to integrate competing logics in unprecedented ways (Scott, 2001). 
It identifies how hybrid organizations are formed and explains when and why hybrid 
organizations’ leaders are capable of taking advantage of the wide repertoire of organizing 
templates available to them in the context of competitive institutional environments. As such, 
it sheds light on the phenomenon of hybrid organizations, which is increasingly common and 
yet poorly understood. 
 
METHODS 
The study used a comparative case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989) allowing for a 
replication logic (Yin, 2003) in which the cases are treated as a series of independent 
experiments that confirm emerging theoretical insights. The research setting is the field of 
“social integration enterprises” in France. Social integration enterprises are private 
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commercial companies – operated as for profit or nonprofit entities - which aim at providing 
long term unemployed people with job opportunities in order to train or retrain them into the 
practices and behaviors of working as an employee.  
Social integration organizations achieve their goal by hiring, for a limited period of 
two years, jobless people to produce products and services (construction, catering, gardening, 
recycling, temp work, etc.) that the organizations then sell on the market. With close 
mentoring, adapted training programs, as well as individual social counseling, these 
enterprises help long term unemployed people readapt to the world of work and regain 
individual pride and confidence. Organizations receive an accreditation from the State to 
operate as social integration enterprises, which entitles them to a public subsidy intended to 
offset the opportunity cost of employing less productive people who require extra 
supervision1. About 1100 such organizations operate across France, employing 25 000 former 
jobless persons and generating more than one billion Euros in revenues yearly (see Appendix 
1 for more details about the field and its history). 
By way of their mission and their web of public and social partners, social integration 
enterprises are embedded in a social welfare logic. By way of their commercial activity, from 
which they derive, on average, 80 percent of their revenues, they are also permanently rooted 
in a competing commercial logic, promoted by clients and industrial partners. Social 
integration enterprises’ dependence on these two webs of support to survive makes their 
demands particularly salient, turning the field into a particularly rich setting to explore 
responses to enduringly competing demands. 
In terms of sampling strategy, we decided to focus on four multi-site organizations that 
had attempted to reach a national scale. The scaling-up process requires from organizations to 
make strategic decisions about organizational structure and design at a time when social and 
                                                 
1 They receive 9681 euros for each social employee hired, except temp work social integration enterprises which 
receive 51 000 euros to hire a social and professional counselor to coach 12 FTE social employees. 
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material support is particularly critical. This makes the conflict among institutional 
prescriptions particularly salient. By intensifying the experience of competing institutional 
demands, as well as the risks incurred when defying them, the scale up process provides a 
particularly rich setting for an exploration of organizational responses. 
 The organizations in our sample were selected from two separate industries in order to 
generate diversity in the observations and produce, as a result, a richer and more generalizable 
theory. Organizations were further selected on the basis of their founding origins (founded by 
a social organization vs. founded by a commercial organization) to explore the strength of 
founding imprint. The four cases thus constituted two matched pairs. One pair operated in the 
recycling industry (SOCYCLE and BUSITECH) while the other operated in the temp work 
industry (TEMPORG and WORK&CO). In each pair, one organization was founded by a 
prominent social sector organization (SOCYCLE and TEMPORG) while the other emanated 
from a large multinational corporation (BUSITECH and WORK&CO). The sampling strategy 
is thus one of 1) contrast within matched pairs that vary in a variable of theoretical interest 
(the founding origins of the organization) for explaining the phenomenon under study and 2) 
replication across pairs from different industries to improve the generalizability of the 
inducted theory. Table 1 describes the four cases analyzed in the paper. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Data collection 
Our study includes both archival and interview data, collected at both the 
organizational and field levels. We started the data collection process by gathering 
information about the field of social integration enterprises in France, its history as well as its 
legal environment through various sources (Ministry of Work, social integration enterprises 
federation, websites on social entrepreneurship, books and articles etc.). We also conducted 
interviews with 14 field experts to understand their views on the evolution of the field and the 
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competing institutional logics that permeate it. These interviews were conducted both before 
and after the collection of case data. 
We collected case data between 2007 and 2008 through interviews as well as 
secondary sources. For each enterprise, we gathered and read all available published material 
(annual reports, press articles, etc.). We conducted semi-structured interviews with a number 
of internal and external informants ranging from 7 to 17, depending on the size of the 
organization. Internal informants systematically included board members, executive directors, 
technical supervisors and social workers. In some cases, we also interviewed external 
informants such as funders, partners and clients. We met with the informants in their 
organization, where we spent between 2 and 5 days. This physical presence allowed us to get 
a sense of the culture and norms within each organization. We conducted a total of 62 
interviews which lasted between 30 minutes and 3 hours, amounting to a total of 91 hours of 
interviews. All interviews were taped and transcribed. We used an interview guide to conduct 
the interviews. The guide was organized around seven categories: founding and growth, 
organizational structure and governance, human resources, commercial strategy, financial 
strategy, performance, environment and stakeholders. Informants were asked to explain how 
their organizations were founded, how they grew, how they were organized in 2007 and why 
they had decided to organize in such a way. This wealth of data allowed us to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the cases as well as the field of social integration enterprises in France.  
Data Analysis 
In a first step, relying on both the cases and the field-level data, we developed an 
analysis of the competing social welfare and commercial logics guiding organizational 
behavior in the field. To develop this preliminary analysis, we relied on institutional logics as 
a method of analysis (Thornton et al., 2008). Institutional logics are “the socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
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provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). More simply put, they are 
the taken for granted social prescriptions guiding behavior of actors in a given organizational 
field: they define what actors in a field understand to be the appropriate goals as well as the 
appropriate means to achieve these goals (Scott, 2001). The power and influence of 
institutional logics reside in their pervasiveness. Field level logics are influenced by broader 
societal logics such as the state, the market, the democracy, the family or the religion 
(Friedland et al., 1991) and influence individuals’ behavior by providing templates for action. 
We started by identifying the prescribed goals and practices for the two competing logics in 
which social integration enterprises in France were embedded. We did so based on the data 
collected and the support of two expert informants in the field, who confirmed that our 
description of the logics competing at the field level was accurate.  
We then analyzed the data by first building a case report for each of the cases, 
describing the profile of informants and of key organizational members (founders, board 
members, key executives), the organizational structure, the values and practices adopted by 
each organization, as well as the justification of these values and practices by organizational 
informants. We then conducted a cross case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) to identify differences 
and similarities as well as common patterns. We developed tables and graphs in order to 
facilitate comparisons, which were conducted iteratively with various permutations of pairs. 
In particular we found that industry differences (temp work versus recycling) were not of 
conceptual importance to understand our findings but that the founding origins did have 
meaningful implications for the process under study, which led to further analysis and 
theorizing. This process led to the insights presented below. First, we describe the two 
competing logics in which the field of social integration in France is embedded. We then 
present the two response patterns that we identified and discuss the theoretical implications of 
these findings for understanding how organizations that are permanently embedded in 
competing institutional logics manage these tensions at the organizational level. 
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COMPETING SOCIAL WELFARE AND COMMERCIAL LOGICS  
IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION ENTERPRISES 
As commercial organizations with a social mission, social integration enterprises are 
embedded in two distinct institutional spheres, in which the cultural beliefs and rules that 
structure cognitions and shape actions are not only different but potentially conflicting.  On 
the one hand, to recruit and mentor social employees as well as to secure financial support for 
their social mission, they are in close interactions with national and local state agencies as 
well as local nonprofit social agencies, which are participants in a belief system which we 
qualify here as the social welfare logic. On the other hand, to secure their market 
sustainability, they rely on clients as well as industrial partners, which are embedded in a 
commercial logic These two logics promote, in the field of social integration enterprises, 
contradicting rules of action as well as organizing principles (Reay et al., 2009). The 
dependence of these organizations on the two spheres to accomplish their mission and, more 
critically, to survive, makes the demands of each sphere not only pressing but inescapable. 
These two belief systems and their associated practices surfaced readily in our interactions 
with our various informants. We describe below the key characteristics of these logics.  
The social welfare logic refers to the way in which social welfare goals have shaped 
norms, values and practices in the field. It is structured around a clear desired goal: addressing 
local social needs and is infused, in France, with the broader societal State logic (Friedland et 
al., 1991). In the field of social integration enterprises, the desired goal is reintegrating long-
term unemployed people on the job market and helping them regain confidence and self 
esteem. The focus on the fulfillment of social needs posits that reaching out to local 
constituencies, making the efforts to understand local needs and adapt to them are key 
demands that social organizations must satisfy (Di Maggio & Anheier, 1990). Social needs 
related to work integration are, in nature, localized, since they concern people and depend 
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upon a variety of local factors including, among others, the composition of the population, the 
state of the local economy and local job market, the state of the local housing market, as well 
as the nature of the local social net. Under the social welfare logic, responses to social needs 
are thus perceived to be best conceived at a local level, where they can take into account the 
strengths and weaknesses of the local context. The responsiveness to social needs is thought 
to be better achieved through a participative organizational structure, as well as a democratic 
governance model, where the communities served, the local organizations representing them, 
as well as social partners, have a say in the decisions taken by organizations (Frumkin, 2002).  
The commercial logic refers to the way in which commercial goals have shaped 
norms, values and practices in the field of social integration. Embedded in a larger societal 
Market logic (Friedland et al., 1991), it is structured around a clear goal: selling products and 
services on the market to generate as much profit as possible that can ultimately be 
legitimately appropriated by shareholders. The commercial logic rewards efficiency and 
control (Alexandrer & D’Aunno, 2003). Pressures for efficiency presuppose that there are 
optimal ways to get organized to rationalize costs and maximize profits. Control is recognized 
as an appropriate governance mechanism because of the legitimacy of the proprietary claims 
of stakeholders and as an efficient means to sustain consistency (Fligstein, 1996). Hierarchical 
control, rather than democratic control, is viewed as the efficient way to coordinate collective 
behavior. With competition a salient feature of the commercial logic (DiMaggio & Anheier, 
1990; Hansmann, 1980), the survival of players in the market depends on their ability to 
differentiate themselves from competitors and to sustain some sort of competitive advantage. 
Predictability in the quality of a service or product is a key determinant of purchase: 
consistency and uniformity in production are a source of sustainable revenues. As stated by 
the executive director of SOCYCLE: “If we want to work in the Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipments industry, there will be two, three contractors organizing a call for 
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tender in one region, where 4 to 5 of our sites have to cooperate, to bid together with similar 
services, similar quality (…).”  
The social integration field in France is thus embedded in these two competing logics. 
These logics and their associated demands permeate organizations through the pressures for 
compliance exerted by institutional referents, such as funders, professional organizations or 
regulators (Scott & Meyer, 1991), as well as through organizational members who, by way of 
their training or their experience, have been socialized into specific logics (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996). Table 2 summarizes the belief systems that characterize these two competing 
logics and how they play out in the field of social integration enterprises. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
It is important to note that, after 30 years of existence, the field of social integration in 
France is still a terrain of institutional conflict. These tensions are reflected in the struggle that 
took place during the 2008 board elections of the national federation of social integration 
enterprises: a group composed of the social workers who had led the national federation since 
its founding and a group composed of younger professionals, adhering more readily to the 
commercial logic, competed fiercely for the leadership of the professional organization. While 
the younger professionals eventually won the election, tensions in the field remained palpable, 
as suggested by this quote from one expert informant: “The new team will have to find a way 
out of the crisis. (…) There will be wounds, because harsh words have been told.” On the 
basis of previous research, one would have expected that, over years, one of the two 
competing social and commercial logic might have gained dominance over the other and 
progressively replaced it (Rao et al., 2003; Thornton, 2002; Thornton et al., 2005) or that a 
new logic would have emerged as a synthesis of the two (Chen & O'Mahony, 2006; Glynn & 
Lounsbury, 2005; Thornton et al., 2005), ultimately providing field actors with undisputed 
organizing templates (Friedland & Alford, 1991). However, by highlighting the persistence of 
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competing organizing templates long after the field’s creation, our field-level data confirms 
that some field configurations expose organizations to permanent competing logics. We now 
turn to the core of our findings, highlighting how competing logics are experienced by social 
integration enterprises and what strategies they mobilize to manage these tensions. 
 
FINDINGS 
Our data suggest that the competing logics at play at the field level are surprisingly 
reconciled at the goal level, yet translate into important tensions at the practice level, exposing 
social integration entrepreneurs to competing organizing templates. We also find that 
decoupling is only a marginal strategy for organizations embedded in such contexts. When 
facing competing organizing templates, organizations hybridize them at the organizational 
level by adopting a combination of intact practices from either logic rather than by 
hybridizing each practice. Finally, the data shows that the founding origin of the organization 
has an important influence on how this combination of pure practices is assembled. We 
develop these findings in the next sections.  
Convergent goals and competing practices 
Past research on conflicting logics has emphasized the tensions emerging from 
competing conceptions of what goals the organization should pursue (Pache et al., 2010; 
Powell & Friedkin, 1986; Purdy et al., 2009) and their pervasive impact on intra 
organizational dynamics (D'Aunno, Sutton & Price, 1991; Glynn, 2000; Zilber, 2006). In the 
context of social integration enterprises, the embeddedness in competing social welfare and 
commercial logics could have translated into two competing conceptions of the core purpose 
of these organizations: addressing social needs vs. generating and redistributing profits, with 
an attempt by organizations at balancing these goals by finding a suitable compromise.  
Surprisingly, the data from this research suggest that there was a very strong field-
level consensus about the appropriate goal of social integration enterprises: all informants, 
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enterprise members as well as experts in the field, without a single exception, stated that the 
goal of social integration enterprises was to reintegrate long term unemployed people on the 
job market. When asked about their knowledge of companies which might have adopted a 
profit generation and redistribution goal, informants cited rumors but could not cite any 
concrete case that they had encountered. A field expert commented: “In theory, an 
entrepreneur could use the social integration vehicle to mobilize public funds and make 
money. Yet I have never seen this happen. The role played by the accreditation commission is 
key and the regional social integration enterprises union, which is a member of that 
commission, has a lot of influence in the process: they know the applicants well because they 
have usually accompanied them through the application process. If they have a doubt, they 
voice it and are usually listened to by the commission.” 
The data thus suggest that conflict on goals is resolved at the field level by the State, 
which grants social integration enterprises with the right to operate. The accreditation process 
is managed at the local level by the local office of the Ministry of Work. This office, after 
consultation with a commission composed of local representatives of the state, local 
governments, local elected officials, the national agency for employment, the regional social 
integration enterprises union, professional organizations and workers’ unions, allows the state 
to contractually define and closely monitor the purpose of the accredited organizations. Not 
only does the process allow the State to keep illegitimate organizations from joining the field, 
but it also allows it to expel accredited organizations out of the field if they fail to meet their 
social obligations. This control is reinforced by the filter operated by the National Agency for 
Employment on the recruitment of social employees: social integration enterprises are 
constrained to recruit social employees among the people identified as “in need for social 
integration” by this national agency. This process keeps organizations from requesting the 
accreditation without complying with its social integration objectives. When asked about a 
possible corruption of the social objective, a field expert explained: “Making money with a 
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social integration enterprise is not really possible because of the costs related to the lower 
productivity of social employees as well as the cost of turnover. The main risk is for social 
integration enterprises to hire people who do not need social integration. Everyone has done 
that occasionally. The real problem starts when they do it systematically. But that is not 
possible because of the control operated by the National Agency for Employment.” 
This finding echoes early conceptualizations of field structures that characterize fields 
on the basis of their degree of fragmentation as well as their degree of centralization (Meyer, 
Scott & Strang, 1987). The field of social integration in France appears quite fragmented 
(Scott et al., 1991). Social integration enterprises depend upon a wide range of actors to 
operate and achieve their mission: the national state, local governments, the national agency 
for employment, clients, funders, social partners, each with a say on what social integration 
enterprises should do and how they should get organized. However, this fragmented field is 
quite centralized (Scott et al., 1991) since it is dominated by an undisputed central actor, the 
national state, which grants social integration enterprises with the right to operate, grants them 
with financial compensation for the social mission that they perform, as well as controls, 
through the state-run national agency for employment, the social employees that they hire. 
This central actor thus resolves potential conflict on goals at the field level (Pache et al., 
2010): actors that promote and endorse alternative goals within the field lose their right to 
operate and are, as a result, expelled from the field (Scott et al., 1991). As a consequence, 
organizations within the field display a very high level of goal congruence. 
Yet, although actors in the field have reached consensus about the goal of their 
organizations, they exhibit strong contradictory beliefs about what are the appropriate 
practices to implement when organizing operations at a national scale. The process of 
expanding operations in multiple geographic areas requires from organizations to make key 
strategic decisions regarding organizational design and governance. These decisions are made 
at a time when social and material support is particularly important for organizations, thus 
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making institutional demands not only salient but also challenging to defy. The difficulty is 
that in the absence of centrally prescribed organizing templates, there is ample room for 
disagreement amongst institutional referents at the field level about the appropriate practices 
that organizations in the field should deploy. 
A set of competing practices indeed emerged from our data. In congruence with 
research on organizational design (Chandler, 1977), we identified in our data two key 
organizational dimensions, structure and operations, in which practices competed. By 
structure, we mean the elements that define, in a constraining and enduring way, the 
architecture of the organization. By operations, we mean the elements mobilized on a day to 
day basis to achieve organizational objectives. In terms of structure, there was indeed 
evidence, at the field level, that the two competing social welfare and commercial logics 
promoted competing practices related to what organizational form to choose for sites, what 
legal status to adopt, and what ownership structure to set up. In terms of operations, there was 
evidence of competing conceptions related to what profit destination to favor, what degree of 
local embeddedness to nurture, what brand to develop, what procedures to localize or 
standardize, what monitoring to implement at central level, what professional affiliation to opt 
for and, finally, whether or not mobilization of volunteers is appropriate. 
The social welfare logic, in accordance with its principles and values, promotes a 
structure founded upon the creation of sites as autonomous local entities, the use of the not-
for-profit legal form, and ownership tied to an adhesion to the mission. At the operational 
dimension, it promotes the absence of profit redistribution, a governance model strongly 
embedded in a network of local actors, the adaptation of the brand and of procedures to local 
conditions, adhesion to the social integration professional organization, and the mobilization 
of volunteers for permanent operational positions. 
These prescribed practices contrast with those promoted by the commercial logic, 
which promotes a structure based on the creation of sites as wholly owned subsidiaries of the 
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mother organization, the use of the for-profit form, and ownership tied to capital. At the 
operational dimension, the commercial logic promotes the systematic redistribution of profit 
to shareholders, the absence of involvement of local actors in site governance, the 
development of an unified brand, the design and enforcement of standard operating 
procedures associated with close monitoring of local practices by the central organization, an 
adhesion to the industry professional organization, and the mobilization of paid staff only (not 
volunteers) for permanent operational positions. 
Importantly, these competing demands are imposed on social integration enterprises 
by a combination of internal and external actors. Social welfare practices are internally 
endorsed and enacted by organizational members professionally socialized as social workers. 
These practices are also demanded by external social partners, who provide social integration 
enterprises with recruitment and training support for social employees, as well as public 
bodies that provide funding and accreditation, and charitable funders. Commercial practices 
are internally endorsed and enacted by managerial and technical staff recruited to manage 
commercial and production operations, as well as externally demanded by clients and 
industrial partners. Although none of the identified competing practices is imposed on 
organizations by regulatory or coercive mechanisms, data suggests that they are strongly 
institutionalized at the field level. The taken-for-grantedness of these practices is vividly 
illustrated by quotes from informants. A social partner of BUSITECH explains how they 
chose their legal status: “We thought about creating a nonprofit because as trade unionists, 
we were not going to create a for-profit company”. WORK&CO’s national coordinator 
commented on how members of MULTIWORK, their multinational mother organization, 
reacted when WORK&CO decided to develop new local sites as autonomous organizations: 
“Their problem was not to invest capital (in the new sites), because investing capital is 
business as usual for a company like MULTIWORK (…) but what was atypical was to create 
autonomous legal entities, because at MULTIWORK, they create clones or secondary 
 19 
establishments.” Various informants mentioned, in addition, that deviating from some of these 
practices could cause them to lose important support. The executive director of a TEMPORG 
site reflects upon his affiliation to the temporary work professional organization: “It is as 
simple as that: if you don’t have it, no one takes you seriously. No one wants to do business 
with you”. Finally, some practices are reinforced by funding criteria chosen by funders. 
BUSITECH’s founder explains: “Foundations and corporations are only going to give their 
charitable Euros to nonprofit organizations. So if you don’t have one, you are in trouble.” 
This normative pressure is confirmed by one of SOCYCLE’s founders: “If the creation of a 
project relies a lot on public funds, then it is safer that control be exercised by people who are 
not involved either as owners or as managers of the organization”. Overall, data suggests that 
these prescribed practices are not only conflicting but also constraining for organizations and 
not easy to ignore or defy. 
We summarize in table 3 the ten practices we identified in the data, being specific 
about their content and how we measured them. We also provide a description of the 
respective prescriptions for each practice, together with supportive quotes.  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
In summary, by operating in a field embedded in enduring competing logics in which 
a central actor had resolved the potential conflict regarding organizational goals, the main 
challenge for social integration enterprises is to figure out how to cope with the competing 
conceptions of what practices are required to achieve that goal. We describe next the response 
patterns that we identified in the data. 
 
Hybridizing practices at the organization level 
When faced with competing templates about how to get organized to scale up, social 
integration enterprises are faced with a dilemma since complying with one set of demands 
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requires from them to defy competing others (Pfeffer et al., 1978). An important risk 
associated with the choice of a given response is to jeopardize the organization’s legitimacy: 
promoters and enforcers of a given logic may decide to withdraw their support to 
organizations that depart from the prescribed template. For example, funders may refuse to 
give grants or subsidies to organizations that do not display the appropriate legal status and 
local actors may limit their collaboration with organizations that do not give them a say in 
their local governance structure.  
Previous research suggests that, under such conditions, organizations are likely to 
resort to decoupling as a response strategy (Elsbach et al., 1992; Fiss et al., 2006; Meyer et 
al., 1977; Westphal et al., 2001). Decoupling is particularly adapted to situations where 
practices promoted by external institutional referents conflict with internal institutionalized 
practices promoted by professional actors (Boxenbaum et al., 2008; Greenwood et al., 1996). 
In that case, organizations symbolically adopt the externally promoted practice while actually 
not implementing it. What they actually implement is the practice that is coherent with their 
internal institutional influences. Such a strategy increases an organization’s chance of survival 
as it prevents conflicts from escalating between internal and external institutional referents. It 
thus becomes a safeguarding mechanism to minimize the risk of legitimacy threats 
(Boxenbaum et al., 2008; Brunsson, 2002). Importantly, most current research on decoupling 
suggests that a balance between symbolism and substance is enacted for each competing 
practice. For example, although organizations formally adopted corporate governance policies 
(Westphal et al., 2001), affirmative action policies (Edelman, Abraham & Erlanger, 1992) or 
quality management practices (Kostova et al., 2002), they actually implemented alternative 
policies and practices. Thus, research suggests that the balance between competing 
institutional demands is made at the practice level. 
Yet, our data suggests that such strategies that involved trade-offs at the practice level 
were only marginal. In contrast we find evidence of an alternative strategy that involved the 
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combination of intact practices promoted by either of the competing logics. The compromise 
was then made at the organization level, not the practice level. SOCYCLE provides a 
compelling illustration of this pattern. Only two out of ten practices were hybridized in such a 
way to at least partially satisfy both logics, including one that exhibited decoupling and one 
that exhibited a compromise. Specifically, in terms of legal status of sites, SOCYCLE adopted 
a combination of for profit and nonprofit forms, sending the signal of adhesion to both logics. 
In terms of standardization practices, SOCYCLE adopted a decoupling approach: it officially 
adopted rigorous standard operating procedures across sites, however, when looking more 
closely, it was clear that these procedures were not implemented at the site level, which 
exhibited local autonomy and variance in procedures. Yet, SOCYCLE’s response strategy 
was different on the eight other scale-up practices. Five of the adopted practices were intact 
social welfare practices. SOCYCLE respected the substance of social prescriptions regarding 
how to structure the network of sites: it developed its sites as autonomous entities, all of 
which were “owned” by strong advocates of the mission of the organization. All for-profit 
sites, in particular, were owned by a local SOCYCLE nonprofit to “ensure that control be 
exercised by people who are not directly involved as shareholders or managers”. This 
ownership structure implied, in addition, the profit destination model prescribed by the social 
welfare logic: profits generated in the for-profit sites were distributed to the non-profit owner, 
which, just as non-profit sites, used these resources to further the organization’s mission. The 
governance model designed by SOCYCLE emphasized, as promoted by the social welfare 
logic, local embeddedness. Control over sites was exercised by local volunteer boards of 
directors, which mobilized key local actors (local public officials, social partners, business 
partners, experts). As explained by a SOCYCLE executive: “Local sites were built on strong 
local roots, with strong political support. SOCYCLE succeeded because the social project 
was strong and because the individuals promoting it were strong too.” Finally, SOCYCLE 
required, from all sites, to affiliate with the local social integration professional union, as a 
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way to demonstrate their connection with the sector. In addition to these five intact social 
welfare practices, SOCYCLE also adopted four intact commercial practices. SOCYCLE 
invested in a strong national brand, a practice promoted by the commercial logic. Not only did 
all sites bear the same name (with the name of the city next to it), but they all shared a similar 
visual identity and developed, a joint website. Very early on, SOCYCLE developed a national 
organization, in charge of development, monitoring and control, in order to ensure 
standardization of operations at the national level. A co-founder explains: “SOCYCLE started 
out as a very tight and controlled group. This tight structure was very important early on, 
because it allowed us to develop the model and to make sure it would not be perverted.” 
Important resources were mobilized and allocated to ensure this monitoring and control 
function at national level. Fourteen staff members were mobilized at the national level, 
financed for 60 percent by the local sites who contributed three percent of their turnover to the 
national organization. Finally, SOCYCLE required from all of its sites to affiliate with the 
waste management professional organization. Overall, SOCYCLE managed its embeddedness 
in competing logics not so much by decoupling its practices, but rather by designing a hybrid 
combination of intact practices borrowed from both logics. The overall pattern of responses is 
described in table 4.  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
We observed very similar patterns in the other three cases. TEMPORG, for instance, 
also adopted eight intact practices out of ten. Complying with the commercial logic, it chose a 
for profit legal status, developed its sites as branches of a national organization, developed a 
common brand identity, mobilized a lot of resources to monitor and control operations at the 
national level, required from all sites to affiliate with the temp work professional 
organization, and ignored volunteers as a potential resource. In compliance with the social 
welfare logic, it chose not to redistribute any dividends to shareholders, developed local 
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ownership by mobilizing local advisory boards composed of local stakeholders, and required 
from all its sites to affiliate with the social integration professional organization. TEMPORG 
did not decouple any practice but hybridized two of them. It developed a hybrid ownership 
structure, combining mission holders (not-for-profit shareholders, for 59 percent) and capital 
holders (private for profit investors, for 41 percent). In terms of procedures, TEMPORG 
standardized a wide range of procedures (HR, accounting, IT, training), yet gave its sites full 
autonomy over pricing and sales. TEMPORG’s full response strategy is presented in table 5. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Similar patterns applied to BUSITECH and WORK&CO: both organizations adopted 
seven intact practices drawn from either logic. Each organization decoupled only one practice 
and hybridized two. Tables 6 and 7 detail their response configurations.  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 8 summarizes the adoption profiles of all four organizations. It is clear that, in 
contrast to what is suggested in the literature, only one in four practices (10 out of 40) 
exhibited an attempt to balance competing demands at the practice level, through decoupling 
or hybridizing strategies. Most of the practices adopted by organizations were intact practices 
from either logic. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Interestingly, these configurations appear to be very stable over time: across all 
organizations, 80 percent of the practices enacted in 2007 were similar to those put in place in 
the early scale up phase. This suggests that the pattern identified is neither temporary nor 
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unstable. Rather, the configurations of practices mobilized appear as lasting commitments to a 
“way of doing things”. Data even suggest that such configurations are hard to change: in 
2007, the leaders of two organizations expressed their desire to change some of the practices. 
SOCYCLE’s leader for instance noted that when the opportunity to invite private investors as 
shareholders of the for-profit sites was discussed, “it was a revolution that was not easy to 
deal with. There was real resistance to change. The old timers, the early activists in the 
network, thought that we were deviating from our social mission, from our social integration 
mission, that we embraced a business goal, whereas for us, it was just a means (…). ” 
Similarly, the national coordinator of WORK&CO explained its difficulties to convince the 
managers of the local sites to adopt a unified brand, reflecting their affiliation with their 
multinational parent: “the social integration company is their toy, they don’t want their 
mother organization to appropriate it.” 
Overall, this analysis indicates that organizations do, on a lasting basis, attempt to 
balance the competing expectations of institutional referents, yet they do so predominantly at 
the organization level rather than at the practice level. And while we found instances of 
decoupling at the practice level, as suggested by the wealth of decoupling studies in 
institutional theory, these remained atypical, rather than predominant. Various factors might 
explain this pattern. First, in the case of a lasting embeddedeness in competing institutional 
logics, organizations may find it difficult to avoid the scrutiny of institutional referents, as 
required by decoupling strategies (Boxenbaum et al., 2008; Meyer et al., 1977). Over the long 
run, the repeated interactions and social connections inherent to any lasting field’s social 
system are likely to expose organizations to the inspection of other actors, thus making it hard 
to fake institutional compliance without running the risk of losing face. In contrast, the pattern 
that we uncovered, which entails the actual adoption of pure practices, allows organizational 
leaders to strategically adopt the practices that they believe best fits with their institutional 
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attachments, thus enabling them to build confidence with their institutional referents 
(Haveman, 2000; Meyer et al., 1977). 
Second, decoupling and hybridizing strategies are potentially costly for organizations 
since they require from organizational members to come up with alternative ways of doing 
things and to sustain these hybrid practices over the long run. Institutional logics provide 
organizational members with “ready-to-wear” practices that can be adopted by organizations 
with minimal cognitive and material efforts. In contrast, organizations that resort to 
decoupling have to mobilize energy and resources to develop the ceremonial required to fake 
compliance. Other hybridizing strategies that combine competing practices in alternative 
ways require from organizations to come up with a new organizing model for the practice, 
which, as a combination of two existing templates, may require specific adaptations. For 
example, SOCYCLE’s strategy to combine both non-profit and for-profit status was indeed 
costly since it required the organization to satisfy both non-profit as well as for-profit 
administrative and regulatory requirements. TEMPORG and WORK&CO’s strategies to 
mobilize a combination of profit and for-profit shareholders required from their leadership to 
spend time socializing the various actors and appeasing the potential tensions emerging 
between shareholders with different goals and motivations. In contrast, the combination of 
intact practices borrowed from the two competing logics is an efficient strategy because it 
relies solely on the mobilization of well known available templates. 
Finally, decoupling and hybridizing strategies at the practice level are potentially risky 
for organizations because they entail the potential dissatisfaction of institutional referents. In 
trying to satisfy all demands only partially, organizations challenge their institutional referents 
and run the risk of jeopardizing their support. By fully addressing some of the demands 
exerted by each institutional referent, organizational leaders may be in safer ground. 
Importantly, the data suggests that the responses patterns crafted by these four 
organizations allowed them to avoid major legitimacy threats and to sustain their activities 
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over the long run: the four organizations not only survived for more than 11 years after 
founding (and up to 22 years for SOCYCLE), but all of them achieved performance levels (in 
terms of turnover , number of social employees hired, as well as annual growth rates in the 
last three years) superior to the average in the field (see Table 1 for detailed numbers). 
Balancing competing demands at the organization level thus appears as a viable response to 
competing institutional demands. 
Interestingly, the cross-case analysis reveals that although all organizations in the 
sample adopted the approach of reconciling logics at the organizational level instead of the 
practice level, the response patterns identified for each case suggest differences in the way 
through which organizations achieved this balance, in particular given their founding origins. 
 
Organizations’ founding origins as a determinant of response patterns 
Organizational behavior is often guided by norms and values embedded in specific 
activities. Occupational groups and professions, in particular, have been identified as 
powerful carriers of institutional logics (Hirsch, 1986; Thornton et al., 2005). For example, 
Hwang and Powell (2009) show that management professionals hired by nonprofit 
organizations introduced rationalizing managerial practices in a sector traditionally exempt 
from rationalization concerns. Building upon this view, one would expect that professionals 
socialized into a given institutional logic would carry over this logic even in other fields. In 
the context of our study, one would expect organizations originating from the commercial 
sphere to adopt primarily commercial practices given the embeddedness of their professionals 
in the commercial logic, and organizations emanating from the social sector to adopt 
primarily social welfare practices, under the influence of social sector professionals.  
Surprisingly, our data suggests a different dynamic. A striking pattern in our sample is 
that organizations that emanate from the commercial sector (i.e. organizations that were 
founded by or in close partnership with a business company) adopted predominantly social 
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welfare practices, and more so than organizations emanating from the social sector (i.e. 
organizations that were founded by or in close partnership with a social sector organization). 
In contrast, organizations originating from the social sector adopted a balanced combination 
of intact social welfare and commercial practices, including more commercial practices than 
organizations originating from the commercial sector.  
The TEMPORG/WORK&CO pair illustrates this dynamic. TEMPORG was rooted in 
the social sector. It was launched in the early nineties as a subsidiary of France’s most 
prominent social integration group founded by two social workers, pioneers of the social 
integration sector. WORK&CO emanates from the commercial sector. It was created as a 
wholly owned subsidiary of MULTIWORK (a leading multinational group in the temporary 
work industry) by two training managers who viewed social integration temporary work as a 
strategic development for their company, as well as an expression of their own values.  
Surprisingly, where one would have expected TEMPORG to adopt predominantly 
social welfare practices, it in fact adopted predominantly commercial practices (six out of 
ten). It chose a for-profit legal status and adopted a branching structure to operate sites, as 
well as a strong uniform brand. In addition, it allocated resources to monitor and control 
standard procedures, affiliated with temporary work professional organizations and decided 
not to mobilize volunteers. Only three out of the ten practices adopted by TEMPORG 
complied with the social welfare logic: the nonprofit appropriation, the mobilization of local 
advisory boards as well as the affiliation with social integration professional organizations. 
Similarly, given its roots, WORK&CO could be expected to adopt primarily commercial 
practices. It did exactly the opposite. It adopted six social welfare practices out of ten. 
Whereas its mother organization was set up as a global web of tightly controlled branches 
with a very strong brand and standardized procedures, WORK&CO chose to operate its sites 
as autonomous legal entities, with no common brand, no common procedures and no 
monitoring and control over the sites. Sites where piloted by volunteer managers from the 
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mother organization, and required to affiliate with the social integration professional 
organization. Only two out of ten commercial practices were fully respected: the for-profit 
legal status, as well as the compulsory site affiliation with the temp work professional 
organization. Overall, TEMPORG, the organization with social origins, behaved more like a 
commercial organization than like a social organization, and, in any case, more commercially 
than WORK&CO did. In contrast, WORK&CO, the organization with commercial origins, 
behaved more like a social organization than like a business, and, in any case, more like a 
social organization than TEMPORG did. 
The SOCYCLE/BUSITECH pair exhibits a similar pattern. BUSITECH, which was 
founded by young retirees of the multinational IT firm COMPUTER, under the impulse of its 
president for France, adopted only one commercial practice: it chose to operate its sites as for 
profit entities. On all other nine dimensions, BUSITECH chose to borrow practices from the 
social welfare logic. In contrast, SOCYCLE, which was founded with close ties to 
COMMUNITY, a very prominent international social organization, adopted five social 
welfare practices and four commercial practices. And whereas it combined both social welfare 
and commercial practices, it adopted more commercial practices than BUSITECH did. 
Table 9 provides evidence for this pattern with a comparison of the four organizations.  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Our informants’ accounts suggest potential explanations for these unexpected 
behaviors. One of our informants with WORK&CO shared: “(When we started to work on the 
creation of our first social integration enterprise in 1991), everybody was after us, especially 
the social sector actors. Because we came to eat off their plate. Because we were big, people 
were afraid of us. Why would we do this job? Necessarily, to make money. And this would 
bother them. This was not our playground.” BUSITECH leaders shared similar perceptions: 
“People from the social world did not like us to enter their private preserve. They considered 
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us as business executive with no experience in the social sector. And because there was 
COMPUTER (their mother organization) behind us, they said: “They want their toy. These 
days, it is good for companies to get involved in social activities, so they do it too. They come 
to eat our bread.”” This resistance was further demonstrated by the reaction of the local 
representatives of the State approached to obtain the social integration accreditation. A 
WORK&CO informant recalls: “They clearly told us: don’t even bother filing your 
application. It will never get accepted.” BUSITECH also received a first refusal from the 
accreditation commission for its site in Bordeaux and had to mobilize the regional prefect to 
get their application accepted the second time. 
These findings suggest that in a field dominated by a social mission, organizations 
with a commercial imprint (BUSITECH and WORK&CO) suffered from an a priori 
legitimacy deficit that seriously jeopardized their very existence and in turn influenced their 
response strategy. WORK&CO leaders, for instance, initially considered adopting the 
commercial practice of creating wholly owned social integration subsidiaries. Negative 
reactions from the regional union of social integration enterprises led them to devise an 
alternative strategy: “We decided to use a chameleon tactic. They think we are the bad guys? 
Then we are going to prove them, in practice, that we are not. And we are going to learn that 
job that we don’t know.” WORK&CO leaders subsequently decided to systematically partner 
with well respected local social actors and to become minority shareholders in these 
autonomous organizations. By 1996, ten such organizations had been launched, borrowing 
heavily, in terms of organizing practices, from the social welfare logic template. BUSITECH 
also decided to ally with a prominent social partner in its Paris site. The president of 
BUSITECH’s partner organization explained: “Their image as former COMPUTER 
executives did not really fit with a social project. The partnership that they built with us 
convinced the accreditation commission to grant BUSITECH with the right to operate as a 
social integration enterprise.” Alliances were thus used by both BUSITECH and 
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WORK&CO to enhance their social legitimacy (Dacin, Oliver & Roy, 2007). Yet, in addition 
to alliance strategies, BUSITECH and WORK&CO overwhelmingly adopted social welfare 
practices when scaling their operations, despite these organizations’ commercial origins. 
Legitimacy concerns thus appear to play a very important role in influencing 
hybridization patterns. Organizations with a commercial imprint chose to compensate their 
initial legitimacy deficit by displaying a very high level of compliance with social welfare 
demands. In doing so, they attempted to demonstrate, in practice, the sincerity of their social 
intentions. These findings provide empirical support for strategic approaches to managing 
organizational legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995): organizations that 
perceive strong legitimacy threats as they enter a new field take a combination of substantive 
and symbolic actions to restore their legitimacy and to gain the required support to operate. 
Yet, our findings expands existing predictions by suggesting that organizations that engage in 
strategically managing their legitimacy in fields with enduring competing demands not only 
adopt the templates favored in the new field but largely give up on their original 
organizational templates.  
Our data further suggests that organizations with a social imprint (SOCYCLE & 
TEMPORG), benefited from an a priori legitimacy capital. No one a priori feared that an 
organization created by former members COMMUNITY, a highly legitimate social sector 
organization, would depart from its social integration mission. As a result, these organizations 
were able to liberate themselves – at least partially – from institutional influences. They were 
thus able to borrow more freely from alternative templates, and in particular from the 
commercial logic template. These findings echo Sherer and Lee’s (2002) study which showed 
that highly legitimate law firms where more free to depart from the dominant recruitment 
model in the field because their high level of legitimacy protected them from the fear of 
losing institutional support. What our study shows is that this pattern goes beyond the 
adoption of a single practice in a context of experimentation: legitimate actors in the field of 
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social integration reconfigured a whole set of practices borrowed from social welfare and 
commercial influences. This was made possible by the relative cognitive autonomy conferred 
by these organizations’ exposure to competing institutional templates.  
It is important to stress that these departures from social welfare practices, in a field 
dominated by a social welfare mission, did not undermine SOCYCLE’s and TEMPORG’s 
legitimacy. After more than fifteen years of operations, both of them still clearly benefited 
from substantial political and public support in addition to support from commercial and 
industrial partners, as well as very high levels of recognition and reputation. Interestingly, 
both exhibited the highest performance level for social integration enterprises in their 
respective industries. TEMPORG was able to recruit 700 FTE social employees in 2007 
where the average temp work company hires 35 FTE. SOCYCLE mobilized 800 social 
employees, where the average recycling enterprise mobilized 15 FTE. While we cannot draw 
direct implications from a comparison with the general population of organizations, this data 
suggests that the response combination crafted by SOCYCLE and TEMPORG allowed 
securing a broad range of social and political support, enabling them to scale up operations 
and maximize social impact by integrating more long-term unemployed people into the work 
force. Their initial social welfare legitimacy, combined with a minimal level of compliance 
with social welfare templates, was enough to please their social constituencies. As a result, 
they were able to gain local political support, mobilize public funds, secure the sourcing of 
social employees as well as guarantee their mentoring by partner social organizations. Their 
ability to display, in addition, compliance with the commercial logic, allowed them gain 
credibility with their commercial constituencies. They were able to interact on a more equal 
footing with industrial partners, clients and investors, and to negotiate, as a result, more 
favorable conditions to sustain their commercial activity. Their hybrid configuration, which 
differed on the structural practices related to legal status and ownership but was remarkably 
similar on the seven operational practices, allowed them to develop an organizational form 
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that combines a high level of central control and coordination with a high level of local 
engagement. This organizational model enabled them to “get the best of both worlds”.  
 
DISCUSSION 
We started this research endeavor by asking how organizations that are permanently 
embedded in competing institutional logics manage the resulting competing demands. A 
thorough examination of organizations in the field of social integration enterprises in France 
allowed us to discover that, under such conditions, the traditional prediction of practice-level 
decoupling (Meyer et al., 1977), while occasionally mobilized, was not predominant as a 
response strategy. Rather, organizations attempted to strike a balance at the organizational 
level by adopting a combination of intact practices from each logic. Our findings thus suggest 
that, by focusing on practice-level response strategies, institutional theorists may have 
overlooked important response strategies to competing institutional logics. In particular, our 
study offers contributions to institutional theory in three areas: by emphasizing the role of 
strategic isomorphism, identifying the importance of original legitimacy capital, and 
developing our understanding of hybrid organizations.  
Strategic isomorphism. Our study sheds a new light on the debate about the role of 
agency in institutional theory. In particular, we provide evidence to the fact that, in the face of 
competing institutional demands, organizations do not blindly comply with institutional 
scripts (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) nor with the cognitive templates that they have been 
socialized into (Hwang et al., 2009). In the field of social integration, organizations with 
social origins were not trapped in mimicking social practices, just as organizations with 
commercial origins were not cognitively constrained to replicate commercial practices. In 
contrast, our data suggests that organizations are able to devise strategic responses to the 
competing demands they are exposed to (Oliver, 1991). In particular, we identify “strategic 
isomorphism” (Aurini, 2006) - the pattern of selectively complying with institutional 
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templates - as a viable strategy for organizations that operate in fields exhibiting enduring 
competing demands. Interestingly, this process not only led the four organizations  to vary in 
their compliance patterns to prevailing institutional practices, but it also led the organizations 
with similar founding origins to adopt similar patterns of response in terms of the number of 
pure practices that they combined from each logic.  
In contrast to decoupling, which entails the ceremonial espousal of a practice with no 
actual implementation, strategic isomorphism refers to the purposeful adoption, by 
organizations, of selected practices among a pool of competing alternatives. Strategic 
isomorphism allows organizations to satisfy symbolic concerns, just as decoupling does. 
Accounts from our informants emphasize the symbolic power of some adopted practices – the 
most visible ones – which were adopted with the purpose of projecting appropriateness, as 
illustrated by this quote by one of SOCYCLE’s site directors, who explains his choice to 
develop a new entity with a for-profit legal status: “A nonprofit can be really professional, 
but, in people’s mind, a nonprofit is not-for-profit, it is not professional, it is not strong, 
financially. So we wanted to enter this competitive space with a business image.” In 
environments where the scrutiny of institutional referents is hard to avoid, such as in 
environments characterized by high levels of fragmentation and moderate or high levels of 
centralization, strategic isomorphism appears as a safer and thus more viable strategy than 
decoupling because it does not put organizations at risk of being caught faking compliance. 
Similarly, strategic isomorphism also appears as superior to practice-level hybridizing 
strategies, such as balancing or compromising (Oliver, 1991) because it keeps organizations 
from having to engage in multiple negotiations with institutional referents or from having to 
craft new practices that are a compromise on practices promoted by each logic. As such, it is a 
less costly strategy, thus potentially more accessible to resource-constrained organizations. 
Original Legitimacy Capital. Another important contribution of our work is the 
identification of organizational founding origins and their associated legitimacy endowment 
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as a determinant of the pattern of strategic isomorphism. Previous research has identified 
status (Sherer et al., 2002) or position in the field (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Leblebici, 
Salancik, Copay & King, 1991) as important organizational determinants of organizational 
responses to institutional influences. Our paper suggests that the founding origins of an 
organization also play an important role in determining its initial degree of social acceptance 
within a given field. This impacts, in turn, whether or not the organization is likely to deviate 
from the predominant institutional templates. Our data shows that in a field that remains 
dominated by its social mission, organizations that emanate from the social sector are freer to 
adopt templates drawn from other logics because they rely on a priori legitimacy capital. 
Because of this capital, institutional referents do not question the organization’s good faith. 
Organizations can thus depart from the dominant practices to adopt competing ones. In 
contrast, organizations that emanate from the commercial sector are perceived as “original 
sinners” and thus suffer from an initial legitimacy deficit because their motives to enter a field 
with a social mission are questioned. To restore their legitimacy, they are constrained to 
demonstrate their fit with the predominant social logic. They overcompensate for this initial 
legitimacy deficit by adopting practices from the predominant logic – and more so than their 
social counterparts in order to demonstrate their appropriateness and secure social support. 
Founding origins (by making organizations insiders or outsiders in a given field) thus 
influence greatly an organization’s legitimacy capital and in turn its capacity to mobilize a 
combination of competing practices. This finding challenges the view of organizations as 
incarnations of institutional logics (Kraatz et al., 2008), which argues that cultural 
understandings imprinted in organizational forms at the time of founding constrain 
organizations throughout their lives (Haveman & Rao, 1997; Rao et al., 2003). Our study 
shows that under conditions of enduring competing logics, founding imprinting may trigger 
change rather than inertia by allowing organizations to deviate from their original institutional 
logic. 
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Hybrid organizations. A key contribution of our paper is offering a better 
understanding of hybrid organizations. Hybrids, defined as organizations that combine in 
unprecedented ways different institutional logics (Scott et al., 1991) are becoming more 
prevalent as the phenomenon of competing logics is itself becoming more widespread (Pache 
et al., 2010; Scott et al., 1991; Seo et al., 2002). While recent studies have paid increasing 
attention to the emergence of this specific type of organizations (Battilana et al., 2010; 
D'Aunno et al., 1991; Haveman et al., 1997; Haveman & Rao, 2006; Rao et al., 2003; Reay et 
al., 2009), we still know little about the specificities of managing hybrid organizations, other 
than their hiring and socialization practices (Battilana et al., 2010)  or their collaboration 
strategies (Reay et al., 2009). Our research focuses specifically on the balancing of practices 
that allows hybrid organizations to scale up. 
Our study suggests that hybrid organizations do not hybridize their practices – or only 
marginally so – but rather adopt a combination of intact practices borrowed from the logics 
they are embedded in. This finding builds upon the conception of logics as “cultural tookits” 
(Swidler, 1986; Tracey et al., 2010) which people can use in various configurations to solve 
different kinds of problems. A great strength of hybrids is thus that they have access to a 
much broader repertoire of practices from which they can borrow and combine in unique 
ways. This places them at an advantage if they are able to craft a configuration of practices 
that fits with the demands from their environment and helps them leverage a wider range of 
support. Yet this strategy also exposes organizations to greater risks of internal conflict 
among members who might champion competing logics (Pache et al., 2010), as well as 
conflict with external stakeholders who hold competing expectations. Extant research indeed 
highlights that hybridization is potentially challenging for organizations and that hybrid 
organizations are unlikely to survive (Aurini, 2006; Battilana et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 1977). 
Our findings provide explanations for how and in what conditions organizations can 
overcome these challenges. 
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First, while the taken-for-grantedness of institutional prescriptions may be weakened 
by the existence of alternative models, these competing models may still strongly influence 
internal groups within the organizations, thereby channeling inside the organization the field-
level conflict of logics (Battilana et al., 2010; D'Aunno et al., 1991; Pache et al., 2010; Zilber, 
2002). For example, in their study of a matched pair of commercial microfinance 
organizations, Battilana and Dorado (2010) found that the organization that had attempted to 
hybridize their workforce by recruiting staff adhering to the two competing logics available in 
the field (the banking logic and the development logic) was unable to prevent conflicts and 
misunderstanding among the two sub-groups (bank workers and social workers) that they 
were trying to integrate. Zilber (2002) highlights a similar pattern of conflict among 
organizational members adhering to competing logics in a rape crisis center. Our findings 
suggest that hybrid organizations can escape these harmful internal conflicts and ensure their 
sustainability if they are not confronted with (or are able to avoid) institutional conflict on 
goals and if they are able to manage institutional conflict on what practices to adopt by 
strategically combining intact practices from both institutional worlds. 
Second, even if organizations were to avoid these internal conflicts by recruiting 
members free from any institutional attachments (Battilana et al., 2010), they nevertheless 
face the challenge of securing support and resources from institutional referents embedded in 
these antagonistic logics. To signal their appropriateness and gain such support, they need to 
comply, at least partially, with the competing practices prescribed by these institutional 
referents. Such a process, leading to the internalization of competing practices (D'Aunno et 
al., 1991; Meyer et al., 1977), is again a potential source of internal tensions. We find that the 
selective adoption of intact practices can enable organizations to please institutional referents 
and thus secure widespread support. Our findings also suggest that organizations may be able 
to strategically distinguish between the important signaling practices that will cue institutional 
referents to the goals and motivations of the organization (such as profit versus non-profit 
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status) from the practices that can be more freely adopted and combined as they are less 
“loaded” with meaning.  
Third, empirical research has shown that an organization’s ability to depart from 
institutional scripts and to borrow from alternative templates is influenced by its position in a 
field (Leblebici et al., 1991), by its status (Sherer et al., 2002) as well as by its exposure to 
alternative logics (Greenwood et al., 2006). This research suggest that all organizations are 
not equally able to become hybrids and that an organization’s initial embeddedness in a given 
logic might play a critical role in constraining or enabling the hybridization process. We 
contribute to this literature by suggesting that organizations that have a priori legitimacy 
capital, due to their original embeddedness in the predominant logic, may be able to craft a 
stable and valuable combination of practices that borrows freely from the competing logics. In 
contrast, organizations that are born outside the predominant logic face a legitimacy deficit 
that forces them to adopt almost fully the organizational script of the predominant logic. 
 Overall, our findings suggest that there is value in exploring the phenomenon of 
organizational responses to competing institutional demands at the organization level. By 
focusing on the symbolic versus substantive adoption of a specific practice in a field, previous 
decoupling studies might have overlooked a much more complex dynamic involving the 
strategic combination of substantive practices. In our research, by raising the level of analysis 
from the practice to the organizational level, we move from a view of organizational leaders 
as actors taking symbolic actions, pretending to adopt practices while decoupling their 
organizational core, to organizational leaders as bricoleurs (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Mair & 
Marti, 2009) who perform institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), combining the 
templates and scripts afforded by a richer institutional environment, while learning to 
navigate the minefields created by enduring institutional conflicts. In doing so, we contribute 
to the development of the micro-foundations of institutional theory, called upon by Powell 
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and Colyvas (2008) and shed light into “why institutional practices and structures take the 
form that they do (p.295)”.  
 We believe that our findings have broader applicability beyond instances of 
competition between commercial and social welfare logics. Our sample was selected on the 
basis of the existence of conflicting demands, rather than on the content of these demands. 
Further, our findings are not specific to the social welfare or commercial sector logics and 
may apply more broadly to any field subject to institutional clashes, such as the clash between 
medical professionalism and  business logics (Reay et al., 2009) or care versus science logic 
(Dunn et al., 2010). Thus, the strategic combination of pure practices, enacted by 
organizations that possess or are able to acquire initial legitimacy capital, may provide a 
blueprint for the development of sustainable hybrid organizations in different organizational 
field that face competing and enduring institutional demands. 
Yet, much remains to be explored in this stream of research. Although we started to 
explore when and how hybrid organizations are able to combine competing institutional 
logics in unprecedented ways, future research needs to clarify in which situations hybrids may 
become a superior organizational form. As suggested by Kraatz and Block (2008) in their 
review of organizational implications of institutional pluralism, organizations that are able to 
embody multiple logics in a sustainable way are likely to be ultimately more legitimate and 
thus to garner more efficiently the social and material support that they require to thrive. Such 
performance study would require an in-depth study of the survival and performance of 
organizations adopting a hybrid model compared to peer institutions remaining faithful to a 
single logic. It would also require exploring the role played by organizational leaders in this 
process, to understand what explains their ability to combine different institutional logics in a 
strategic way. 
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CONCLUSION 
Overall, hybrid organizations defined as those that are able to combine competing 
institutional logics in unprecedented ways (Scott et al., 1991) are becoming increasingly 
prevalent in society as organizations increasingly face competing institutional logics. The rise 
of the field of social enterprise, of which social integration organizations are one of the 
examples, attests to this trend. Yet, the specific management practices that allow 
organizations to combine competing institutional logics to form hybrids have been 
understudied. In addition, their ability to survive and grow as a hybrid has been questioned by 
current literature (Aurini, 2006; Battilana et al., 2010). Our study sheds a new light into this 
emergent phenomenon and advanced our understanding of hybrid organizations.  
Conflicts in institutional logics can be experienced at the level of goals or at the level 
of means/practices required to achieve these goals (Pache et al., 2010). Our research shows 
that as long as the conflict on goals is resolved at the field level by a central actor, hybrid 
organizations, especially the ones that benefit from a priori legitimacy by virtue of their 
founding origins, are able to combine pure practices from the different institutional logics, 
thus developing a distinctive organizing template that allows them to effectively scale their 
operations. This suggests that hybrids may be a viable organizational form that can exhibit 
distinct advantages in complex and permanently conflicting institutional environments. 
 
 40 
REFERENCES 
Ashforth, B. E., & Gibbs, B. W. 1990. The double edge of organizational legitimation. 
Organization Science, 1(2): 177-194. 
Aurini, J. 2006. Crafting Legitimation Projects: An Institutional Analysis of Private Education 
Businesses. Sociological Forum, 21(1): 83-111. 
Baker, T., & Nelson, R. E. 2005. Creating Something from Nothing: Resource Construction 
through Entrepreneurial Bricolage. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(3): 329-366. 
Basu, O. N., Dirsmith, M. W., & Gupta, P. P. 1999. The coupling of the symbolic and the 
technical in an institutionalized context: The negotiated order of the GAO's audit 
reporting process. American Sociological Review, 64(4): 506-526. 
Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. 2010. Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of 
commercial microfinance organizations. Academy of Management Journal, (in 
press). 
Binder, A. 2007. For love and money: Organizations' creative responses to multiple 
environmental logics. Theory and society, 36: 547-571. 
Boxenbaum, E., & Jonsson, S. 2008. Isomorphism, diffusion and decoupling. In R. 
Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby, & K. Sahlin-Andresson (Eds.), The Sage 
Handbook of Organziational Institutionalism: 840. London: Sage. 
Brunsson, N. 2002. The Organziation of Hypocrisy. Oslo: Abstract Liber. 
Chandler, A. D. 1977. The Visible Hand. Boston: Belknap. 
Chen, K. K., & O'Mahony, S. 2006. The selective synthesis of competing logics. Paper 
presented at the Academy of Management Proceedings. 
Clemens, E. S., & Cook, J. M. 1999. Politics and institutionalism: Explaining durability and 
change. Annual review of sociology, 25: 441-466. 
 41 
D'Aunno, T. A., Sutton, R. I., & Price, R. H. 1991. Isomorphism and external support in 
conflicting institutional environments: A study of drug abuse treatment units. 
Academy of Management Journal, 34(3): 636-661. 
Dacin, M. T., Oliver, C., & Roy, J. P. 2007. The legitimacy of strategic alliances: An 
institutional perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 169-187. 
Di Maggio, P., & Anheier, H. K. 1990. The sociology of nonprofit organizations and sectors. 
Annual review of sociology(16): 137-159. 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48: 147-
160. 
Djelic, M. L., & Quack, S. 2004. Globalization and institutions: Redefining the rule of the 
economic game. Northampton, M.A.: Edward Elgar. 
Dorado, S. 2005. Institutional entrepreneurship, partaking and convening. Organization 
Studies, 26(3): 385-414. 
Dunn, M. B., & Jones, C. 2010. Institutional Logics and Institutional Pluralism: The 
Contestation of Care and Science Logics in Medical Education, 1967--2005. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1): 114-149. 
Edelman, L. 1992. Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: Organizational mediation of 
Civil Rights Law. American Journal of Sociology, 97: 1531-1576. 
Edelman, L. B., Abraham, S. E., & Erlanger, H. S. 1992. Professional construction of law: 
The inflated threat of wrongful discharge". Law & Society Review, 26: 47-94. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4): 532. 
Elsbach, K. D., & Sutton, R. I. 1992. Acquiring organizational legitimacy through illegitimate 
actions: A marriage of institutional and impression management theories. Academy of 
Management Journal, 35(4): 699-738. 
 42 
Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. 2004. The diffusion of idea over contested terrain: The 
(non)adoption of a shareholder value orientation among German firms. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 49: 501-534. 
Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. 2006. The symbolic management of strategic change: Sensegiving 
via framing and decoupling. Academy of Management Journal, 49(6): 1173-1193. 
Fligstein, N. 1996. Markets as politics: A political-cultural approach to market institutions. 
American Sociological Review, 61(August): 656-673. 
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. 1991. Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and 
institutional contradictions. In W. W. Powell, & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis: 232-263. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Frumkin, P. 2002. On being nonprofit. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
George, E., Chattopadhyay, P., Sitkin, S. B., & Barden, J. 2006. Cognitive underpinnings of 
institutional persistence and change: A framing perspective. Academy of Management 
Review, 31(2): 347-365. 
Glynn, M. A. 2000. When cymbals become symbols: Conflict over organizational identity 
within a symphony orchestra. Organization Science, 11(3): 285-298. 
Glynn, M. A., & Lounsbury, M. 2005. From the critic's corner: Logic blending, discursive 
change and authenticity in a cultural production system. Journal of Management 
Studies, 42(5): 1031-1055. 
Greenwood, R., Diaz, A. M., Li, S. X., & Lorente, J. C. 2010. The Multiplicity of Institutional 
Logics and the Heterogeneity of Organizational Responses. Organization Science, 
21(2): 521-539. 
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. 1996. Understanding Radical Organizational Change: 
Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism. Academy of Management 
Review, 21(4): 1022. 
 43 
Greenwood, R., & Suddaby, R. 2006. Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: The big 
five accounting firms. Academy of Management Journal, 49(1): 27-48. 
Haveman, H. A. 2000. The future of organizational sociology: Forging ties among paradigms. 
Contemporary sociology, 29: 476-486. 
Haveman, H. A., & Rao, H. 1997. Structuring a theory of moral sentiments: Industrial and 
organizational co-evolution in the early thrift industry. American Journal of 
Sociology, 102(6): 1606-1651. 
Haveman, H. A., & Rao, H. 2006. Hybrid forms and the evolution of thrift. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 49(7): 974-986. 
Heimer, C. A. 1999. Competing institutions: Law, medicine and family in neonatal intensive 
care. Law & Society Review, 33(1): 17-66. 
Hirsch, P. M. 1986. From Ambushes to Golden Parachutes: Corporate Takeovers as an 
Instance of Cultural Framing and Institutional Integration. American Journal of 
Sociology, 77: 800-837. 
Hoffman, A. J. 1999. Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the U.S. 
chemical industry. Academy of Management Journal, 42(4): 351-371. 
Hugues, J. M., & Gasse, M. 2004. Face à la crise, de vraies entreprises, CNEI Mag, Vol. 26: 
20-23. 
Hwang, H., & Powell, W. W. 2009. The Rationalization of Charity: The Influences of 
Professionalism in the Nonprofit Sector. Administrative Science Quarterly, 54(2): 
268-298. 
Kostova, T., & Roth, K. 2002. Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations: Institutional and relational effects. Academy of 
Management Journal, 45(1): 215-233. 
 44 
Kraatz, M. S., & Block, E. S. 2008. Organizational Implications of Institutional Pluralism. In 
R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby, & K. Sahlin-Andresson (Eds.), The Sage 
Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism: 840. London: Sage. 
Lawrence, T. B., & Suddaby, R. 2006. Institutions and institutional work. In S. Clegg, C. 
Hardy, T. B. Lawrence, & W. R. Nord (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Organization 
Studies: 215-254. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
Leblebici, H., Salancik, G. R., Copay, A., & King, T. 1991. Institutional change and the 
transformation of interorganizational fields: An organizational history of the U.S. 
radio broadcasting industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(3): 333-363. 
Lounsbury, M. 2005. Competing logics and the spread of recycling advocacy groups. In G. F. 
Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, & M. N. Zald (Eds.), Social Movements and 
Organizationa Theory. NYC: Cambridge University Press. 
Lounsbury, M. 2007. A tale of two cities: competing logics and practice variation in the 
professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2): 289-
307. 
Mair, J., & Marti, I. 2009. Entrepreneurship in and around institutional voids: A case study 
from Bangladesh. Journal of Business Venturing, 24(5): 419-435. 
Meyer, J., Scott, W. R., & Strang, D. 1987. Centralization, fragmentation and school district 
complexity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 186-201. 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth 
and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2): 340-363. 
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap. 
Nigam, A., & Ocasio, W. 2009. Event Attention, Environmental Sensemaking, and Change in 
Institutional Logics: An Inductive Analysis of the Effects of Public Attention to 
Clinton's Health Care Reform Initiative. Organization Science: orsc.1090.0490. 
 45 
Oliver, C. 1991. Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management 
Review, 16(1): 145-179. 
Pache, A. C., & Santos, F. 2010. When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of 
organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. Academy of 
Management Review, 35(3): 455-476. 
Pauly-Aboubadra, S. 2004. Le temps des pionniers, CNEI Mag, Vol. 26: 6-9. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. New York, NY: Harper and Row. 
Powell, W. W., & Colyvas, J. A. 2008. Microfoundations of Institutional Theory. In R. 
Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby, & K. Sahlin-Andresson (Eds.), The Sage 
Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism: 840. London: Sage. 
Powell, W. W., & Friedkin, R. 1986. Politics and programs: Organizational factors in public 
television decision making. In P. DiMaggio (Ed.), Nonprofit enterprise in the arts: 
245-269. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Purdy, J. M., & Gray, B. 2009. Conflicting logics, mechanisms of diffusion and multilevel 
dynamics in emerging institutional fields. Academy of Management Journal, 2(52). 
Rao, H., Monin, P., & Durand, R. 2003. Institutional change in Toque Ville: Nouvelle Cuisine 
as in identity movement in French gastronomy. American Journal of Sociology, 
108(4): 795-843. 
Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. 2009. Managing the rivalry of competing institutional logics. 
Organization Studies, 30(06): 629-652. 
Ring, P. S., Bigley, G., D'Aunno, T., & Khanna, T. 2005. Perspectives on how governments 
matter. Academy of Management Review, 30(2): 308-320. 
Scott, W. R. 1987. The Adolescence of Institutional Theory. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 32(4): 493-511. 
 46 
Scott, W. R. 1994. Conceptualizing organizational fields: Linking organizations and societal 
systems. In H. Derlien, U. Gerhardt, & H. Scharpf (Eds.), Systemrationalitat un 
Partialinteresse: 203-221. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Scott, W. R. 2001. Institutions and organizations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications. 
Scott, W. R. 2003. Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems (4th ed.). Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Scott, W. R., & Meyer, J. W. 1991. The organization of societal sectors: Propositions and 
early evidence. In W. W. Powell, & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis: 108-142. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
Seo, M., & Creed, W. E. D. 2002. Institutional contradictions, praxis and institutional change: 
A dialectical perspective. Academy of Management Review, 27(2): 222-247. 
Sherer, P. D., & Lee, K. 2002. Institutional Change in Large Law Firms: A Resource 
Dependency and Institutional Perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 
102. 
Stevens, J. M., Steensma, H. K., Harrison, D. A., & Cochran, P. L. 2005. Symbolic or 
substantive document? The influence of ethics codes on financial executives' 
decisions. Strategic Management Journal, 26(2): 181-195. 
Suchman, M. C. 1995. Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy 
of Management Review, 20(3): 571-610. 
Swidler, A. 1986. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. American Sociological Review, 
51(2): 273-286. 
Thornton, P. H. 2002. The rise of the corporation in a craft industry: conflict and conformity 
in institutional logics. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 81-101. 
 47 
Thornton, P. H., Jones, C., & Kury, K. 2005. Institutional logics and institutional change in 
organizations: transformation in accounting, architecture and publishing. Research in 
the Sociology of Organizations, 23: 125-170. 
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. 1999. Institutional Logics and the Historical Contingency of 
Power in Organizations: Executive Succession in the Higher Education Publishing 
Industry, 1958-1990., American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 105: 801-844: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. 2008. Institutional Logics. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. 
Suddaby, & K. Sahlin-Andresson (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism: 840. London: Sage. 
Tracey, P., Phillips, N., & Jarvis, O. 2010. Bridging Institutional Entrepreneurship and the 
Creation of New Organizational Forms: A Multilevel Model. Organization Science: 
orsc.1090.0522. 
Westphal, J. D., Gulati, R., & Shortell, S. M. 1997. Customization or Conformity? An 
Institutional and Network Perspective on the Content and Consequences of TQM 
Adoption. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(2): 366. 
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. 1994. Substance and symbolism in CEOs' long-term incentive 
plans, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 39: 367-390: Administrative Science 
Quarterly. 
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. 1998. The Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate 
Governance Reforms and Shareholder Reactions., Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 43: 127-153: Administrative Science Quarterly. 
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. 2001. Decoupling policy from practice: The case of stock 
repurchase programs. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46: 202-228. 
Yin, R. K. 2003. Case study research: Design and methods. Thousand Oaks, MA: Sage. 
 48 
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. 1995. Accounting for the explanations of CEO compensations: 
Substance and symbolism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 283-308. 
Zilber, T. B. 2002. Institutionalization as an interplay between actions, meaning and actors: 
the case of a rape crisis center in Israel. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 
234-254. 
Zilber, T. B. 2006. The work of symbolic in institutional processes: translations of rational 
myths in Israeli high tech. Academy of Management Journal, 49(2): 281-303. 
 
 49 
APPENDIX 1 
The field of social integration enterprises in France 
Key Figures 
In 2007, 10982 social integration enterprises existed in France, 44 percent of them 
operating under a non-profit status, and 56 percent of them operating under a for-profit 
status3. The average social integration enterprise mobilized 1 million Euros in revenues, 80 
percent of which from sales. Other revenues included the above mentioned state contribution, 
as well as other public or private grants. The average enterprise hired 24 FTE employees, 15 
of which were “social employees”. The largest social integration enterprise in France hired 
2300 FTE employees across the country and was largely diversified (operating in the temp 
work, gardening, catering, moving and construction industries).  
History 
The first social integration enterprises were created at the end of the 70’s by social 
workers who, in the context of the emerging economic crisis, found it increasingly frustrating 
to see youths at risk and people without professional qualification face difficulties to join 
“regular” companies. Recognizing the limits of the social approaches sponsored by their 
social organizations (targeting primarily health, housing or poverty issues) to address job-
related issues, they decided to create commercial subsidiaries – initially called “intermediary 
companies” – that were specifically designed to help unemployed people learn the skills of 
work. They offered social employees paid short term contracts, focusing on activities that 
were simple enough to be accessible to people without qualification and organized a close and 
indulgent supervision to accompany social employees in the learning process.  
Rapidly identified by policy makers concerned by the increasing unemployment rates, 
and benefiting from the lobbying efforts deployed by the pioneers of the field, these 
experimentations were progressively legitimized through various laws (in 1979, 1985, 1991, 
1998 and 2006) which granted them with the right and duty to operate as real economic 
entities. These laws adapted the French labor law to allow social integration companies to 
resort systematically and repeatedly to fixed-term contracts for their social employees4. In 
turn, they required social integration companies to pay social employees at minimum wage 
and to comply with legal and fiscal requirements. National policy makers rapidly 
institutionalized public financial support, in compensation for the costs incurred by the extra 
supervision requirements and the below-average productivity of social employees. This 
                                                 
2 Source : Ministry of Work Data 2007 
3 Source: National Federation of Social Integration Enterprises Data 2007 
4 Fixed-term contracts are, under the French labor law, officially reserved to specific circumstances (temporary 
or seasonal increase in activity, replacement of a sick employee, etc.). 
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national recognition, together with the support provided by local governments, helped the 
field structure and develop.  
Over the years, social integration enterprises grew more and more separate from the 
social institutions which had founded them. While this initial affiliation had helped social 
integration entrepreneurs reach out to social policy makers, it also generated tensions with 
traditional social actors who viewed them as “joining forces with the bosses” or as 
“exploiters” (Pauly-Aboubadra, 2004). The scattered initiatives that had flourished across 
France thus felt a growing need to join efforts and collaborate. The first regional union of 
social integration enterprises was created in 1983, soon followed by other regional unions, 
which led to the creation of the national federation of social integration enterprises (CNEI) in 
1988 and the formalization of the first charter of social integration enterprises. In turn, the 
growing visibility of the field led to the emergence of tensions with the commercial sector, 
which started to perceive these new enterprises as unfair competitors, due to the public 
subsidies that they received.  
Since the 90’s, in the face of the aggravation of the economic crisis, social integration 
enterprises consolidated their position as both social and economic actors. With 
unemployment rate reaching heights (up to 14 percent between 1994 and 1998), and with an 
increase in the time required for jobless people to find a job (in 1995, 40 percent of 
unemployed people had been looking for work for more than one year), social integration 
enterprises became an important building block of local and national employment policies. 
During that period, they developed partnerships with local governments, and often obtained 
access to local public funds in addition to the regulated state subsidy. They developed 
relationships with the public national employment agency, in charge of identifying potential 
social employees, as well as with local social and public actors in charge of social and 
professional integration issues locally. Yet under pressure to sustain their economic activities, 
social integration entrepreneurs progressively adopted “business entrepreneurs” practices 
(Hugues & Gasse, 2004). Entrepreneurs with social backgrounds invested in management 
trainings and entrepreneurs with new profiles, business school graduates as well as more 
experienced former business executives, started to join the field (Hugues et al., 2004). This 
trend consolidated in the years 2000, as more and more organizations in the field voiced their 
identity as “real companies”, started to join employers unions, and partnered with capitalist 
businesses to develop business opportunities. In the middle of the years 2000, social 
integration enterprises were thus integrated in both the social and the economic sphere. 
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TABLE 1 
Description of cases 
 
Cases SOCYCLE TEMPORG BUSITECH WORK&CO 
Number of interviews 17 12 12 7 
Industry Recycling Temp Work Recycling Temp Work 
Activity Recycle used white goods Offer temp work services 
to private companies 
Recycle used computers Offer temp work services 
to private companies 
Number of sites  48 23 5 5 
Founding year 1985 1991 1995 1994 
Scaling year 1988 1993 1995 1994 
Founding origins Social Sector Social Sector Business Sector Business Sector 
Total Staff (FTE) 
Number of  “social 
employees” (included) 
1070 
800 
840 
700 
40 
30 
200 
170 
Total resources 28 M € 21 M € 1,6 M € 5 M € 
Sales / Total resources 70% 85% 80% 85% 
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TABLE 2 
Competing belief systems of the social welfare and commercial logics 
DIMENSION 
SOCIAL 
WELFARE 
LOGIC 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS FOR 
SOCIAL WELFARE LOGIC 
COMMERCIAL 
LOGIC 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS FOR 
COMMERCIAL LOGIC 
Organization’s 
focus of attention 
Social employees 
(i.e. long term 
unemployed people) 
are the main focus 
of attention of the 
organization 
“The risk is that one day, we decide to select people 
when they join the organization. “Let’s refuse this one 
because we won’t be able to do anything with him”. 
My main mission is to give everybody a chance, 
precisely those who are rejected by other employers.” 
(SOCYCLE site manager) 
Clients (i.e. 
purchasers of goods 
and services) are the 
main focus of 
attention of the 
organization 
“We are no charities. We have to know who we deal 
with: with clients who are demanding, who have their 
own constraints, who have their own criteria. We have 
to listen to their concerns, to their needs and find the 
best possible solutions for them. Then we can take the 
social dimension into account.” 
(WORK & Co site manager) 
Production  
Products and 
services should be 
adapted to local 
social needs 
“It is very important to know your community well, if 
you want to address their needs. What legitimacy do 
we have to impose our model in neighboring 
communities? None. We are no imperialists. But we’ll 
help them if they ask us to.” 
(Field informant) 
Products and 
services should be 
consistent and 
uniform across 
market 
“It is clear, our main partner has no patience with our 
internal debates, and with the fact that our people in 
city X want to do things differently than our people in 
city Y. They want a single contact person and a single 
way to do things. Else they’ll go see our competitors.” 
(SOCYCLE federation manager) 
Control 
mechanism 
Democratic control 
is the appropriate 
way to monitor 
strategy and 
operations 
“It was important to give people (i.e. local entities) a 
say in the decisions, to give them ownership of the 
project, to collectively discuss orientations and 
possible evolutions. It seemed to me more democratic 
than the functioning we had where a tight group was 
taking all the decisions and the others would 
execute.” 
(SOCYCLE board member) 
Hierarchical control 
is the appropriate 
way to monitor 
strategy and 
operations 
“Off course, our site entrepreneurs have to be 
responsible and autonomous, and we put the systems in 
place to make sure they are, but at the same time, we 
want to control, evaluate and monitor them.” 
(TEMPORG executive director) 
Goal 
Overall goal is to 
address social needs 
(i.e. contribute to 
the work 
integration of long 
term unemployed 
people) 
“The goal is to make sure that these people find a 
permanent job. Temp work is only a means to achieve 
our social aims. We are not in for profits or 
dividends.” 
(TEMPORG site manager) 
Overall goal is to 
generate and 
redistribute profits 
“When we discussed about having COMPUTER, our 
mother organization, invest capital in BUSITECH, we 
thought: “Definitely not, the Americans will never 
understand what a social integration enterprise is 
about and they will ask for dividends.”” 
(BUSITECH executive director) 
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TABLE 3 
Competing scale up practices 
 
 PRACTICES CONTENT SOCIAL WELFARE LOGIC COMMERCIAL LOGIC MEASURE 
Organizational 
form 
What is the 
legitimate 
organizational form 
of sites? 
Autonomous entities 
Sites should be structured as autonomous entities 
that allow for tailoring products and services to 
local social needs and for the mobilization of local 
support. 
“We could have chosen to develop as a group with 
subsidiaries, but we wouldn’t have had access to 
volunteers in local boards who have close ties with 
local funders and were able to mobilize local 
support.” (SOCYCLE national board member) 
Branches or wholly owned entities 
Sites should be structured as entities that allow for 
coordination and homogenization of actions to 
ensure consistency in goods and services. 
 
“What was atypical for MULTIWORK was to 
create autonomous legal entities, because at 
MULTIWORK, they create clones or secondary 
establishments.” (WORK&CO national 
coordinator) 
Legal structure of 
sites 
Legal status 
What is the 
legitimate legal 
status of operating 
sites? 
Non profit form 
Sites should be formed as nonprofit entities 
because that legal status is the best safeguard 
against mission drift. 
“The non profit status obliges us to keep our focus 
on social integration. If we would change statuses, 
even with our current board, some would say “let’s 
go make profits”. (SOCYCLE site board member) 
For profit form 
Sites should be formed as for profit entities 
because they are professional commercial entities. 
“We chose a for profit status because we operate 
in a competitive space and we needed an image 
different from a non-profit. A nonprofit can be really 
professional but in people’s minds, a nonprofit is not for 
profit, it is not professional, it is not strong financially. 
So we wanted to enter this competitive space with a 
business image.” (BUSITECH founder) 
Incorporation status 
of sites 
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
Ownership 
Who are the 
legitimate owners of 
the sites? 
Mission guardians 
The legitimate owners of sites are those who 
define, promote and protect the social mission of 
the organization. 
“This non profit, owing 20% of the shares, is 
composed of volunteers, who are the owners – put 
it in brackets- and the guardians of the company’s 
social mission. They are leaders who historically 
participated in the group’s definition of its social 
mission.” (TEMPORG executive director) 
Capital holders 
The legitimate owners of sites are those who have 
invested capital in the sites. 
 
“I don’t want to create a company that generates 
surplus and makes shareholders happy.” 
(BUSITECH founder) 
 
Dominant ownership 
of sites 
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Profit 
destination 
What is the 
legitimate use of 
profit? 
Reinvestment in social mission 
The legitimate use of profits is their reinvestment 
in the mission of the organization. 
“What we want is to generate surplus to create 
jobs or to train those who work with us. (…) If we 
generate surplus, which we do, we create new jobs, 
we create a new company or hire – as we did 
recently – a social worker or training 
expert.”(SOCYCLE site manager) 
Appropriation by private interests 
The legitimate use of profits is the distribution of 
dividends in proportion to the capital invested. 
“MULTI WORK (WORK&CO mother 
organization) is now managed from Zurich and 
Chicago and these guys know nothing about social 
integration in France. So at some point, they will 
ask for a return on investment.” (WORK&CO 
national coordinator) 
Surplus distribution 
practices 
Local 
embeddedness 
What is the 
legitimate level of 
involvement of local 
actors in site 
governance? 
Involvement of local actors in site 
governance 
Local actors, who are legitimate experts of local 
needs, should be involved in the leadership of local 
sites.  
“There is one thing that I really shouldn’t do: 
recreate the multinational company that I worked 
for 30 years. So the idea is that if there are local 
entrepreneurs willing to launch a BUSITECH site, 
we are willing to help them, to share our know-
how and to have them join our network. We are 
ready to help, but the locals have to take the lead.” 
(BUSITECH founder) 
No involvement of local actors needed in 
site governance 
Experts, mobilized at the national level, are 
legitimate to address organizational and strategic 
challenges.  
“It is a great comfort to know that everything is 
controlled in headquarters. We have experts on 
various issues, such as legal affairs, accounting, 
management and social work. If we are in trouble, 
we know exactly whom to contact.” (TEMPORG 
site manager) 
Systematic 
involvement of local 
actors in site 
governance 
Brand (name, 
identity) 
What is the 
legitimate scope for 
brand identity? 
Localized 
The brand should be defined at the local level, as a 
way for local actors to express their autonomy and 
identity. 
“What our partners buy is our deep knowledge of 
the community, our local networks. This is what 
matters most to them. The brand, the looks and all 
that does not matter do them that much.” (Field 
expert)  
Unified 
The brand should be unified across all sites to 
project consistency in identity and quality.  
“When I talk about our network made of different 
brands to large companies, they look at me, 
puzzled, asking: “what is that thing?” 
(WORK&CO deputy coordinator) 
Branding uniformity: 
Common name? 
Common visual 
identity? 
O
P
E
R
A
T
I
O
N
S
 
Procedures 
localization 
What is the 
legitimate level of 
localization of 
operating 
procedures? 
Locally adapted procedures  
Procedures should adapted at the local level to 
adapt to the specific needs and resources of the 
local environment. 
““Locally, there is a nonprofit which is in charge, 
responsible and which is close to the field and thus 
knows what can be done and what cannot be done. 
It is not an entity in Paris that should tell this site: 
“this is what you should do.”” (SOCYCLE 
national board member) 
Standard operating procedures 
Procedures should be standardized to because this 
is a potential source of cost reduction and 
efficiency. 
“One of the issues with our site managers is that 
they are not systematic and regular with sales 
initiatives. So we hired a national sales director 
who will define a real planned national sales 
strategy, and who should do what.” (TEMPORG 
executive director) 
Existence and 
enforcement of SOP: 
in HR, Accounting, 
IT, Training, Sales, 
Pricing? 
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Monitoring 
What is the 
legitimate level of 
site monitoring? 
Local monitoring of sites 
No central resources are needed to monitor sites 
because practices designed at the local level should 
also be controlled at the local level.  
“We rather use a participative approach where we 
share ideas, where we don’t force things. Mark 
and myself, we are social, so we decided we would 
not impose things. There is a whole ideology 
behind that posture.” (WORK&CO deputy 
coordinator) 
Central monitoring of sites 
Centrally designed standard procedures should be 
monitored centrally, thus requiring the mobilization 
of resources at the central level. 
“If you want quality, there is no way out of 
monitoring sites and helping them to learn from 
each other.” (TEMPORG executive director) 
Royalties paid by 
sites to fund central 
monitoring 
organization 
Professional 
affiliation 
What is the 
legitimate affiliation 
with professional 
organizations? 
Social integration federation 
The social integration federation is the place where 
the interests of social integration professionals are 
best represented and promoted.  
“It is important that there is a structure that helps 
us as social integration enterprises, that represents 
us, that does lobbying when necessary. So I chose 
to remain affiliated with them.” (BUSITECH 
founder) 
Industry federation 
The recycling or temp work industry federations 
are the places where the interests of recycling and 
temp work are best represented and promoted 
“The affiliation with PRISME (temp work 
professional association) is indispensable in terms 
of image. It means that we are serious.” 
(WORK&CO site manager) 
Systematic site 
membership with 
professional 
organization 
O
P
E
R
A
T
I
O
N
S
 
Mobilization 
of volunteers 
What is the 
legitimate use of 
volunteers as a 
human resource? 
Mobilization of volunteers  
(including in operational positions) 
Volunteers are not only valuable but desired 
resources because they embody the values of 
solidarity and disinterested commitment to a cause. 
“Why is a nonprofit better? Because (…) it allows 
for the mobilization of volunteers. What I like 
about it is that there is no self interest. So people’s 
sole motivation is what we do.” (Field informant) 
No mobilization of volunteers 
Volunteers are unknown resources in the 
commercial sector, where paid professionals are 
the only legitimate human resources. 
“One cannot create a real company with members 
who are totally volunteers. That is good for 
charitable organizations, for the Red Cross or 
other places like that.” (BUSITECH founder) 
Existence of 
volunteers in 
operational positions 
other than board 
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TABLE 4 
SOCYCLE’s Response strategy to competing social welfare and commercial logic in 2007 
 
PRACTICE MEASURE PURE SOCIAL WELFARE PRACTICE 
DECOUPLED AND HYBRID 
PRACTICE 
PURE COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICE 
 
Organizational form Legal form of sites Sites are autonomous legal entities     
 
Legal status 
 
Incorporation status of sites  
 A combination of nonprofit 
and for profit sites   
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
 
Ownership 
 
Dominant ownership of sites 
All sites (including for profit 
ones) are owned by a local 
non profit 
    
 
Profit destination Surplus distribution practices No profit appropriation 
    
 
Local embeddedness Systematic involvement of local actors in site governance 
Governance by local boards of 
directors composed of local 
actors     
 
Brand 
 
Branding uniformity:  
Common name? 
Common visual identity? 
  
 
Common name +  
common brand identity + 
common communication tools 
 
Procedures localization 
 
Existence and enforcement of SOP 
in HR, Accounting, IT, Training, 
Sales, Pricing? 
  
Decoupled standardization 
(formal procedures written 
yet not always applied)   
 
Monitoring 
 
Royalties paid by sites to fund 
central monitoring organization     
Sites pay 3% of their turnover 
to HQ 
 
Professional affiliation Systematic site membership with professional organization Yes (all sites)   Yes (all sites) 
O
P
E
R
A
T
I
O
N
S
 
 
Mobilization of 
volunteers  
Existence of volunteers in 
operational positions other than 
board 
    
No volunteers in operational 
functions other than board 
members 
TOTAL NR OF PRACTICES ADOPTED 5 2 4 
Deleted: P:¶
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TABLE 5 
TEMPORG’s Response strategy to competing social welfare and commercial logic in 2007 
 
CONSTRUCT MEASURE 
PURE  
SOCIAL WELFARE 
PRACTICE 
DECOUPLED AND 
HYBRID PRACTICES 
PURE  
COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICE 
 
Organizational form Legal form of sites     Sites are branches of a national organization 
 
Legal status 
 
Incorporation status of sites      All sites operated under the for profit status 
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
 
Ownership 
 Dominant ownership of sites  
 Combination of private and 
nonprofit shareholders (with 
slight majority to nonprofit 
organization) 
  
 
Profit destination Surplus distribution practices 
 No profit appropriation  
(moral agreement among 
shareholders)   
 
 
Local embeddedness Systematic involvement of local actors in site governance 
Mobilization of local 
advisory boards with local 
actors required for all sites 
 
  
 
Brand 
 
Branding uniformity:  
Common name? 
Common visual identity? 
    Common name + common brand identity 
 
Procedures localization 
 
Existence and enforcement of 
SOP  in HR, Accounting, IT, 
Training, Sales, Pricing? 
  Some common procedures and autonomy on others    
 
Monitoring 
 
Royalties paid by sites to fund 
central monitoring organization     
Sites pay 4,5% of their 
turnover to HQ 
 
Professional affiliation Systematic site membership with professional organization 
Yes 
(All sites)  
Yes 
(All sites) 
O
P
E
R
A
T
I
O
N
S
 
 
Mobilization of volunteers  
Existence of volunteers in 
operational positions other than 
board 
    No 
TOTAL NR OF PRACTICES ADOPTED 3 2 6 
Deleted: P:¶
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TABLE 6 
BUSITECH’s Response strategy to competing social welfare and commercial logic in 2007 
 CONSTRUCT MEASURE 
PURE  
SOCIAL WELFARE 
PRACTICE 
DECOUPLED AND 
HYBRID PRACTICES 
PURE  
COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICE 
 
Organizational form Legal form of sites  Sites are autonomous legal entities    
 
Legal status 
 
Incorporation status of sites     All sites are for profit  
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
 
Ownership 
 
Dominant ownership of sites  Each for profit site is owned by a non profit     
 
Profit destination Surplus distribution practices  
Occasional profit 
redistribution  
 
Local embeddedness Systematic involvement of local actors in site governance 
Governance by local boards 
of directors composed of 
local actors     
 
Brand 
 
Branding uniformity:  
Common name? 
Common visual identity? 
  
Decoupled branding: 
common name, but no 
common identity and 
communication tools 
  
 
Procedures localization 
 
Existence and enforcement of 
SOP  in HR, Accounting, IT, 
Training, Sales, Pricing? 
No common procedures   
  
 
Monitoring 
 
Royalties paid by sites to fund 
central monitoring organization 
No resources allocated to 
monitoring     
 
Professional affiliation Systematic site membership with professional organization   
Some sites decide to affiliate 
with industry + social 
professional organizations 
  
O
P
E
R
A
T
I
O
N
S
 
 
Mobilization of volunteers  
Existence of volunteers in 
operational positions other than 
board 
Most sites operations run by 
volunteers (20 volunteers 
mobilized in operations) 
    
TOTAL NR OF PRACTICES ADOPTED 6 3 1 
Deleted: :¶
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TABLE 7 
WORK&CO’s Response strategy to competing social welfare and commercial logic in 2007 
 
CONSTRUCT MEASURE 
PURE  
SOCIAL WELFARE 
PRACTICE 
DECOUPLED AND HYBRID 
PRACTICES 
PURE  
COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICE 
 
Organizational form Legal form of sites  Sites are autonomous legal entities    
 
Legal status 
 
Incorporation status of sites     All sites operated under the for profit status  
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
 
Ownership 
 Dominant ownership of sites  
Combination of capitalist and 
non profit shareholders (with 
slight majority to capitalist 
shareholders) 
  
 
Profit destination Surplus distribution practices  
Decoupled redistribution: 
announces no redistribution 
yet occasionally redistributes 
  
 
Local embeddedness Systematic involvement of local actors in site governance   
Local ownership by local 
shareholders only   
 
Brand 
 
Branding uniformity:  
Common name? 
Common visual identity? 
No common brand: no 
common name + no 
identity 
    
 
Procedures localization 
 
Existence and enforcement of 
SOP  in HR, Accounting, IT, 
Training, Sales, Pricing? 
No standard operating 
procedures     
 
Monitoring 
 
Royalties paid by sites to fund 
central monitoring 
organization 
No resources allocated to 
monitoring     
 
Professional affiliation Systematic site membership with professional organization 
Yes 
(All sites)  
Yes 
(All sites) 
O
P
E
R
A
T
I
O
N
S
 
 
Mobilization of volunteers  
Existence of volunteers in 
operational positions other 
than board 
Each site managed by a 
volunteer manager  
(5 volunteers) 
    
TOTAL NR OF PRACTICES ADOPTED 6 3 2 
Deleted: :¶
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TABLE 8 
Synthesis of Response patterns 
 
 ORGANIZATIONS WITH SOCIAL ORIGINS ORGANIZATIONS WITH BUSINESS ORIGINS 
  SOCYCLE TEMPORG BUSITECH WORK&CO 
PRACTICES Social Decoupled / Hybrid Commercial Social 
Decoupled / 
Hybrid Commercial Social 
Decoupled / 
Hybrid Commercial Social 
Decoupled / 
Hybrid Commercial 
Organizational 
form 9         9 9     9    
Legal status  9       9     9     9 
Ownership 9       9   9       9  
Profit destination 9     9       9     9  
Local 
embeddedness 9     9     9       9  
Brand   9     9   9   9    
Procedures 
localization  9     9   9     9    
Monitoring   9     9 9     9    
Professional 
affiliation 9   9 9   9   9   9   9 
Mobilization of 
volunteers   9     9 9     9    
TOTAL # OF 
PRACTICES 
ADOPTED 
5 2 4 3 2 6 6 3 1 6 3 2 
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 TABLE 9 
Founding origins as a determinant of response strategies 
 
 
  
TOTAL NUMBER OF PRACTICES ADOPTED 
CASE FOUNDING ORIGINS 
INTACT 
SOCIAL WELFARE 
PRACTICES 
DECOUPLED AND HYBRID 
PRACTICES 
INTACT  
COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICES 
SOCYCLE Social Sector 5 2 4 
TEMPORG Social Sector 3 2 6 
TOTAL PRACTICES ADOPTED BY ORGANIZATIONS 
ORIGINATING FROM THE SOCIAL SECTOR 8 4 10 
BUSITECH Commercial Sector 6 3 1 
WORK&CO Commercial Sector 6 3 2 
TOTAL PRACTICES ADOPTED BY ORGANIZATIONS 
ORIGINATING FROM THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR 12 6 3 
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